Monday, March 16, 2015

Protest and Expression

                Smith’s moral protest account is thought-provoking but seems farfetched at times.  By building on the arguments of Sher and especially Scanlon, she must do a lot of work to break down and rework parts of their accounts she finds insufficient.  It seems the only thing she has any real problem with is the lack of accountability and acknowledgement moral blame seems to have in Scanlon’s account – she labels this missing piece moral protest.  I see how adding this feature may make Scanlon’s account fuller and more complete however I fail to see how it severely changes his account.  With the addition of moral protest, blame is now an expressive agent that allows you to protest and express your discomfort in being wronged in whatever way you feel you have been.  Smith is just giving a better account of reactive attitudes while labeling Scanlon’s relationship management as protest instead.   

                Take the case of the mother whose son went to jail for performing an unjust act.  I believe Scanlon’s approach does a fine job of explaining the blame in this case while I feel Smith’s is a little implausible.  The feelings the mother has towards the son are certainly feelings of blame, it is just the way that she reacts and the way that their relationship might change that is different under the account of moral protest.  In this case, the result is not a negative consequence within the relationship that the son knows of.  The mother surely has unspoken blame towards the son but just may deem it inappropriate to express it.    

2 comments:

  1. I had a very similar problem with Smith’s account of blame. I think that many of the issues that she has with Sher and Scanlon’s accounts were not even properly explained using her “moral protest” piece. It seemed that she was just renaming all the pieces of Scanlon’s accounts and adding more exceptions. I do not necessarily think that Smith’s view brings anything new to the table. For example, Smith tries to say that moral protest accounts for things such as “private blame” but it is not clear that this piece actually does. According to Smith, moral protesting refers to modifying one’s own attitudes, intentions, and expectations towards that person and seeking some kind of acknowledgment (43). If you’re blaming someone privately for something they once did without their knowledge, it shows that you are holding them accountable for their behavior but this fails to fit into Smith’s own definition of her account; there would never be any way that any kind of acknowledgment would possibly be able to take place. I would be curious about Smith’s response to this issue.

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  2. I had a very similar problem with Smith’s account of blame. I think that many of the issues that she has with Sher and Scanlon’s accounts were not even properly explained using her “moral protest” piece. It seemed that she was just renaming all the pieces of Scanlon’s accounts and adding more exceptions. I do not necessarily think that Smith’s view brings anything new to the table. For example, Smith tries to say that moral protest accounts for things such as “private blame” but it is not clear that this piece actually does. According to Smith, moral protesting refers to modifying one’s own attitudes, intentions, and expectations towards that person and seeking some kind of acknowledgment (43). If you’re blaming someone privately for something they once did without their knowledge, it shows that you are holding them accountable for their behavior but this fails to fit into Smith’s own definition of her account; there would never be any way that any kind of acknowledgment would possibly be able to take place. I would be curious about Smith’s response to this issue.

    ReplyDelete