Actions, Intentions, Consequences: A bit more developed

Scanlon criticizes intentionalists and makes many arguments against intentions playing a role in whether an action is permissible or impermissible.  Scanlon believes that only actions play a rule in the permissibility of cases, otherwise the morality of these cases become too shifty and unsound. 

In class, I supported and argued for an alternate view in which intentions and motives of the individual are defined within the individual action.  In this case, different intentions and motives would intrinsically lead to different actions.  Therefore, bad intentions lead to impermissible actions and in order for an action to be permissible, good intentions should be the motivating force. 

I also wanted to make a point about intentions and consequences.  This relates to my idea that there are two kinds intentions (which Scanlon briefly mentions in chapter one but in a different way).  After class, I was contemplating the talk about how consequences fit into whether an action is permissible or not.  After tossing things back and forth in my mind, one thing that stuck with me was that the intention of the consequence plays the largest role.  If the underlying goal of morality is to become a better person, then the intended consequences of the actions should hold more weight than the actual consequences.  

My overall view is still in the process of developing, but I look forward to continuing challenging this idea in the future.