I find Scanlon’s account of
discrimination, particularly of the racial kind, to be incongruent with how we
commonly judge it. I refer primarily to his arguments from 73-74, in which he
contends that the reason we find discrimination like racism so reprehensible is
due to the consequences. This account strikes me as wrong for two reasons.
First, in our natural discourse and feelings, we tend to hold people that have
racist opinions, even if they do not engage in discrimination themselves, in
low regard, and very frequently shame such people. I think that if we
encountered someone who believed that the Japanese were simply an inferior race
in all regards, but never acted in a way to discriminate against Japanese
people, we would still likely find such a person worthy of shame.
Scanlon can
easily respond that the way we interpret these things is just the wrong way of
looking at the issue, and our gut instincts are wrong. This brings me to my
second point: discrimination such as racism is so deeply flawed and profoundly
unreasonable that it is deserving of shame. Someone who holds such opinions
just seems to be the wrong kind of person. It does not require any great
stretch of reason to conclude that racism is wrong, and it similarly does not
take much of a leap to conclude that there is something wrong about a person
who holds racist opinions, even if they do not actively contribute to
real-world discrimination (such as employment, education, etc.). If we have the
goal of evaluating somebody’s character as good or bad, that person’s beliefs
and intentions are relevant, even if her impacts on the world at large are
completely benign.
Additionally, Scanlon takes the time to point out that discrimination on his account is "uni-directional", meaning it is only ethically relevant when being directed towards those already being discriminated against. This conclusion strikes me as preposterous, and leads to its own outrageous scenarios, such as it being ethical to deny someone employment because they belong to the "advantaged" race at the time.
Now I don't disagree with you especially as my following arguments realistically probably lack the scale to really completely undermine what you've said but even they do at least bring them into question and show that they aren't universal. I'm actually going to start with your second argument that being racist makes you flawed and blame worthy (I know that's more strongly then you worded but you get the point). The human brain naturally categorizes people and things based on traits and experiences as a coping mechanism because it actually cannot simply assess everything it encounters as though it were completely new. As such everyone is racist to a certain degree and has prejudices and biases, its unavoidable. Being natural to the human brain and based on experience and upbringing I think it is unfair to call all racism blameworthy as its unavoidable and hypocritical. (I'm not saying racism is ok just that it can't be so easily written off).
ReplyDeleteAs for your argument about people who have racist beliefs but don't act as racists and the fact that we still blame them even though you say they don't have impact. Well to start with we may still blame them simply because we categorize them with those who do have a negative impact discriminating against them in a sense. Additionally one could argue that simply by having those beliefs they are perpetuating them and in so doing allowing others to have a negative impact, thus having an indirect negative impact. Theoretically one could never perpetuate their beliefs in anyway but really only in theory and one couldn't know that a person would never perpetuate their beliefs anyway and so would still be biased against them.
I’m actually not sure on your first two points if you are necessarily in disagreement with Scanlon. Scanlon says that “[discriminatory actions] are thus wrong because of their consequences - the exclusion of some people from important opportunities - and because of their meaning – the judgment of inferiority that they express and thereby help to maintain” (73). This statement does imply that there is no moral significance between racist actions done by an intentionally racist person and an ignorant racist person. Both of these actions are wrong. You are saying that the person who simply believes that the Japanese are an inferior race should be shamed, even if they do not commit any hate crimes based on their belief. Are you also saying though that just by thinking what they think (by whatever means they happened to come to that belief) that they are doing something morally permissible? I feel like you are not saying that, and simply that there is something innately wrong with thinking racist thoughts that is not being appreciated enough by Scanlon. Sure, he may not be giving it as much attention, but I think he would also agree with you in saying that those people should be shamed for having those thoughts, but until they act upon them, it is not up to a decision in moral permissibility. Until they act upon those racist thoughts, they are simply intentions in the mind, which, according to Scanlon, are not morally impermissible. He would say on his second dimension, I believe, that those are people that you should not form relationships with. They are not praiseworthy, even though they do not necessarily commit any morally impermissible crimes.
ReplyDeleteTo address your last argument, I feel that discrimination is absolutely about the power dynamic between groups of people. To not factor in the power of certain groups, I believe would be to ignore the foundation of institutionalized racism. I would disagree with you because I believe that discrimination is unidirectional in the sense that it can only come from the group of people with the power. If you are not part of the party in power, you do not have the ability to discriminate, because discrimination means to rid people of their human rights – a power that is not given to you.