I am hesitant to fully jump aboard Scanlon’s train because of
his non-conformist view that intention does not play a significant role in the
moral permissibility of an action – however I do have to agree with him. The moral permissibility of an action must rest
with the valuation of action itself, not one of permissibility of the agents
carrying out the action. Our intended (seen)
effects of an action verses unintended (unforeseen) effects of an action should
have no bearing on the moral permissibility of an action. Take the example of bombing a munitions
building he gives. Whether you intend to
only kill those in the building and civilians still die or you intend to kill the
civilians, the action is still morally impermissible regardless of the
intent.
Intentions are a way we have found to justify impermissible
actions. If we do the wrong things for
the right reasons, suddenly they become permissible. It is possible that intent will change how we
carry out our actions, and it may even cause us to change the actions
themselves, however it will absolutely not change the outcomes and moral
permissibility of the action itself according to the deliberate and critical
uses Scanlon outlines in chapter one.
I think you take a very interesting approach to intentions, describing them as essentially excuses for doing impermissible acts. Although I'm not entirely on board, I would like to press upon how you would respond to intention in seemingly permissible acts. Does intention also play out in the same fashion for the morally permissible? If you were given the situation of someone intending to do good or someone unintentionally doing good, would they still hold equal moral weight - as you seem to suggest with your argument of unintending harm and intending harm.
ReplyDeleteI tend to agree with what Sam had proposed in her blog post, a spectrum of permissibility, a scale of sorts. I do not think that if someone does something wrong for the right reason it doesn't make the action permissible. It makes the action a little less hard to swallow, to accept. It is still wrong, but it is less morally impermissible then actually intending to do the harm.