I like a lot of what Scanlon argues about the moral weight
of blameworthiness and blame, and its effect on relationships. However, I
believe he makes a pretty large assumption: all rational beings like to engage
in relationships with other people. Though I believe this idea might be
generally true, I do not think that he can reasonably state that every rational being has this desire.
I think this could become a problem when we are speaking of
Person D, who drives recklessly, and due to moral luck, accidentally hits and
kills a small child. With Scanlon’s theory of blame and blameworthiness, person
D’s action is blameworthy because his actions represent attitudes that could
impair his relationships with other rational beings, and he is also to blame
because the agent (the small child’s parent) has reason to “hold attitudes
toward him that differ, in ways that reflect this impairment, from the
attitudes required by the relationship one would otherwise have with the
person” (145). However, what relevance does this blame or blameworthiness have
when person D has no regard or desire for personal relationships? Person D
would not change his attitudes or be affected by blame if he does not want to
engage in personal relationships. Does blame have any significance when there
is no hope that the blame will foster a change? Sure, Scanlon may argue that yes,
blame would matter regardless because the agent would not engage in a
relationship with person D. Then, what if this agent also did not value
engaging in relationships with others? Blame would not be a factor according to
Scanlon’s definition because neither party values relationships. Blame would therefore
be arbitrary. I believe that if the assumption of valued relationships can be
proved false, Scanlon’s definition of blame and blameworthiness would not have
much practical value.
I don’t think I agree with your objection to Scanlon’s notion that all rational beings like to engage in relationships with other people. Scanlon’s definition of relationship does not refer strictly to romantic relationships or even friendships—I think it is a loose term that encompasses these, but also includes interactions that are as minimalistic as symbiosis between animals. We still hold certain expectations from our strangers and acquaintances. We expect them to respect our personal space and privacy, not to intentionally hurt us, and to abide by a universal set of laws. Even reclusive people who are uninterested in friendships or romantic partnerships (in fact, possibly especially these people) wish to be in “relationships” with others in which these ground rules are mutually understood.
ReplyDeleteThe relevance of being held blameworthy for reclusive person D is that if he breaches the basic guidelines understood in his moral relationship with a stranger, thus impairing the relationship, then he may no longer be entitled to the rights he is afforded in that relationship. This includes judgment by third parties. He may not care if the stranger he hurts will never wish to engage in a friendship with him again, but he can still be concerned that his blameworthiness entails a loss of privileges such as space or privacy. A careless, child-endangering man who does not repent for his death-causing negligence could easily incite vengeful behavior from onlookers. Although Scanlon believes that even psychopaths deserve basic rights in moral relationships, I believe that the fear of losing them does serve as motivation not to purposely or inadvertently cause harm to others for people who do not particularly care for friends or the well-being of strangers.
Michelle also brought up the situation of enemies, who do not care about impairing their relationships with one another. However, I argue that even enemies are forced to draw certain lines by these social constraints. Even if you do not care about impairing a relationship with your enemy, objective third parties are still watching your actions and making judgments about you. In treating your enemies with too much brutality, you risk making others wary of entering relationships with you.
Although I think the case of the person who does not value relationships is an interesting one, I do not think that it necessarily causes trouble for Scanlon.
ReplyDeleteFirst, in the case when the guilty party does not care for relationships, blame can still be important because Scanlon interprets blame primarily as a change in the responder’s attitude. This change in attitude does not require a response nor does it require the guilty party to care about relationships. In the Joe case, for example, Joe may not care particularly about his relationship to his friend. But regardless of Joe’s apathy for relationships, blame and a recalibration of the friend’s attitude towards Joe is appropriate. The same would apply to a hermit – other people would change their attitude towards the hermit despite the hermit’s desire for isolation (although we probably would not call this change in attitude blame, per se.)
Second, in the case when neither party cares for relationships, you seem to be correct in saying that blame would not be a factor. However, this does not mean that Scanlon is necessarily wrong. Because Scanlon’s blame is an attitude change, the two apathetic parties would have to change their attitudes for there to be blame. But because neither cares, there is no attitude change necessary, and consequently, no blame either. Therefore, Scanlon’s definition of blame and your case are not incompatible.
I think it is also important to consider whether it is even possible to escape relationships simply because one does not want them. Take Scanlon’s case of the parent-child relationship for example. When a parent has a child, the parent instantly gains some sort of responsibility for the child’s well-being, whether or not the parent wants the relationship or not. Even if the parent decides to give the child up, the parent should still ensure that the child’s future is not significantly harmed and that the child is provided proper care. Simply by having this relationship fall upon the parent, certain attitudes and responsibilities became expected of the parent. In a similar way, it may be that simply by having the status of “human being” or “rational agent” fall upon someone, that it is reasonable for other similar beings to expect certain things from and have certain attitudes towards that person. (I do think that Scanlon’s use of the word “relationship” is too strong of a word, and that simply “relation” might be better.) Perhaps our relation to others as human beings is one that cannot simply disappear because we do not want it.